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Petri Talvitie
University of Helsinki
Early modern states were important landowners throughout the 
Nordic countries after the Reformation. In the mid-17th century, over 
half of all farms in Denmark and Norway were owned by the crown. 
In Sweden and Finland, the share of crown farms was at its highest 
level at the turn of the 18th century. As many as 70% of all farms in 
Finland were crown farms after the Great Northern War (1700–1721). 
In Sweden, the corresponding percentage was 36 in 1700.
The high proportion of state landowning in Finland resulted 
mainly from the large-scale desertion of farms during the severe 
famine years of 1695–1697, when approximately one-quarter of 
the population died. According to statutes, the crown was entitled 
to confiscate freeholding farms if the owner failed to pay taxes 
for three consecutive years. Hundreds of freehold farms also 
became crown farms in Norrland between 1695 and 1725 because 
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of tax arrears. Most of the crown farms in Sweden, however, were 
former Church estates confiscated by King Gustav Vasa (r. 1523–
1560) after the Reformation.1
This chapter discusses the selling of such a massive amount of 
landed property during the 18th century in Sweden and Finland. 
The operation was called skatteköp by contemporaries, literally 
meaning tax purchase. The term refers to the fact that every crown 
farm that was bought during the operation was converted into a 
‘tax farm’ (Sw. skattehemman), i.e. into a freeholding farm that the 
owner was entitled to bequeath to his or her offspring. The focus 
of the chapter is on state finances. The principal objective of the 
chapter is to analyse the role of skatteköp in the Swedish public 
economy and to illustrate that, initially, the entire phenomenon 
was closely related to the war economy. The Swedish crown began 
to sell its farms in 1701 to finance its war efforts, and after the year 
1719 to amortise the public debt generated by extensive military 
spending during the Great Northern War.
Several other European states also resorted to the same method 
of raising finances during the 16th and 17th centuries. The heav-
ily indebted Danish government was obliged to alienate crown 
estates to its creditors after the mid-17th century for several mil-
lion Danish rigsdalers. These sales signified a massive transfer of 
landed property from the public domain to private landowners, 
mainly to wealthy burgers and noble officers from Copenhagen, 
northern Germany, and the Netherlands. Owing to the sales, the 
share of crown estates in relation to all landed property decreased 
from 50% to 27% between 1660 and 1688. The same process also 
took place in Norway, which was part of Denmark until 1814.2
Likewise, several Tudor and Stuart kings and queens were forced 
to turn to crown estates to finance their warfare on the continent 
and on the British Isles. The sales began in the 1540s when King 
 1 Jutikkala 1976, p. 359; Hermansson 1979; Myking & Rasmussen 
2010, pp. 289–293.
 2 Jespersen 2000, pp. 96–97; Myking & Rasmussen 2010, pp. 292–293; 
Olsson & Morell 2010, p. 315.
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Henry VIII sold most of the estates he had confiscated from the 
Church during the Reformation because he needed money for an 
ongoing war against France and Scotland. Alienations also con-
tinued during the 17th century, gradually altering the structure of 
the state budget. At the turn of the 17th century, one-third of the 
fiscal incomes of the English crown originated from crown estates; 
a hundred years later, rents and other revenues derived from the 
crown lands comprised only 5% of public incomes.3 Crown lands 
were also sold in several German principalities after the Reforma-
tion, as well as in France during the wars of religion, despite the 
fact that French kings were not allowed to sell crown property 
without the consent of the parliament.4
This is not the first work to argue that the selling of crown farms 
was closely connected to state finances. Eli F. Heckscher mentions 
in his pioneering article on skatteköp that the operation was moti-
vated by fiscal goals during the Great Northern War. Also, Eino 
Jutikkala briefly refers to fiscal needs in some of his writings.5 
However, no scholar has actually investigated the motivations for 
selling crown farms before. Most studies concentrate on the legis-
lation regulating the sales as well as on the actual selling process, 
focusing on who the buyers were, what their social backgrounds 
were, and what the average sales prices were.6
Additionally, the social and economic consequences of the sales 
have been analysed to some extent. According to Heckscher, the 
extensive sales of crown farms were decisive for the strengthen-
ing of peasants’ political influence in 19th-century Sweden. Owing 
to skatteköp, peasant farmers were able to dominate the second 
chamber of the reformed parliament after 1866, when national 
voting and eligibility rights were determined by income or real 
estate ownership. Mats Olsson and Patrick Svensson argue that the 
 3 Hoyle 1992; Elton 1997, p. 196; O’Brien & Hunt 1999, pp. 60–61.
 4 Vann 1984, p. 228; Cohn 1987, pp. 167–174; Bonney 1995, 
pp. 447–448.
 5 Heckscher 1944, p. 111; Jutikkala 1963.
 6 Rydeberg 1985; Kyle 1987.
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process also had economic consequences, at least in Scania, where 
the productivity of agriculture increased from the 1780s onwards. 
Their conclusion is based on the fact that freehold farms produced 
more than crown farms in Scania during that period of time.7
Markku Kuisma likewise emphasises the economic effects by 
underlining the close relationship between forest-based industry 
and the sales of crown land. Most crown farms were sold to peas-
ant farmers, and, when the forest prices began to rise at end of the 
19th century, freeholding peasants were able to benefit from 
the economic upturn, and thus the operation quite probably 
reduced economic inequality in industrialising Finland.8
The purpose of this chapter is to point out that there was also a 
seller involved in the process, and that by analysing the motiva-
tion of the seller it is possible to complement the picture we have 
of skatteköp, which formed one of the most significant reorganisa-
tions of land ownership in Sweden and Finland during the early 
modern period.
Historical Background
Most of the crown farms in Sweden and Finland were sold during 
the 18th and 19th centuries. The roots of the phenomenon, how-
ever, are to be found in the 1580s, when John III (Sw. Johan III), the 
king of Sweden (r. 1569–1592), began to sell crown farms to finance 
an ongoing war against Russia. The first regulations were enacted 
in March 1582. During that time, the crown owned approximately 
one-third of all farms in Sweden. In Finland, the share of crown 
land was much lower, only 2–3%. Over 90% of farms belonged to 
freeholding peasants during the late 16th century.
There are several reasons why the sales began during the 1580s. 
The state budget was constantly running a deficit during the 1570s 
and 1580s because of a lengthy military campaign against Russia. 
 7 Heckscher 1944, p. 103; Olsson & Morell 2010, p. 332; Olsson & 
Svensson 2010, p. 291.
 8 Kuisma 2006; Bengstsson et al. 2018.
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The most important fiscal revenues came from taxes and custom 
duties, as well as from the sales of copper and iron. The flows of 
public money, however, were not enough to cover the expenses 
stemming from the recruiting of foreign mercenaries, from the 
transporting of troops and from the maintenance of the navy and 
army. King John III and his administration tried to borrow money 
from European credit markets, but these efforts were not success-
ful and the king had to resort to other means, including debase-
ment, the outsourcing of iron production, the pledging of crown 
estates as collateral for silver and cash, and the direct selling of 
crown farms.9
Also, the taxation burden increased during the Russo-Swedish 
War of 1570–1595. The Swedish system of taxation consisted 
of permanent taxes, such as annual rent (jordeboksräntan), and 
temporary taxes, such as contributions (war taxes) and auxiliary 
taxes. When the government wanted to levy a new auxiliary tax 
– a common occurrence during the 16th and 17th centuries – it 
had to consult the Swedish Parliament (Sw. Riksdag) and its four 
estates: nobility, clergy, burghers and peasants.
Until the late 16th century, most of the taxes paid by the peasant 
population were permanent taxes, the most important of which 
was the annual rent. After the 1570s, however, the share of auxil-
iary taxes rose, and by the end of the century over half of all taxes 
collected by the state in Finland were temporary wartime taxes. 
The burden was so high that hundreds of peasant families were 
incapable of managing their obligations, and the fiscal desertion 
of farms increased rapidly. The extent of desertion varied, but in 
some regions as many as 30% or even 50% of farms were unable to 
settle their taxes during the early years of the 16th century.10
The sales of crown farms during the reign of John III were called 
bördsrättsköp, which can be translated as the sales of hereditary 
rights. These sales were highly regulated. A peasant who bought 
 9 Odén 1955, pp. 354–375; Odén 1967, pp. 10–12; Loit 1979; 
Hallenberg 2008, p. 44.
 10 Jutikkala 1963; Seppälä 2009.
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a crown farm during the 1580s and 1590s was entitled to transfer 
the farm to his offspring after the purchase. He was also allowed to 
sell the farm, but only to other peasants, and he was not allowed 
to ask for more money than he had paid to the crown in the börds­
rättsköp. The nobility was not allowed to participate in these 
land markets. It should be underlined that the state did not lose 
anything in the process in fiscal terms because the annual rent 
and other obligations remained unchanged. Geographically 
speaking, the sales were relatively common in central Sweden. 
In the province of Upland, for instance, one-fifth of all crown 
farms were bought between 1582 and 1587. In other parts of 
Sweden, the sales were much rarer, and they were forbidden 
altogether in Finland and Estonia, as well as in the regions con-
quered from Russia.11
The sales of crown farms continued again after 1623. This time 
the phenomenon was called skatteköp. The sales were again closely 
connected to the Swedish war economy, this time to fund the mili-
tary campaigns in Poland and Germany. During the same period, 
the government also sought to benefit from crown lands by other 
means. In 1622, the king began to sell crown farms to the nobility. 
Tax revenues from freeholding farms were also sold. These sales 
(Sw. frälseköp) differed from skatteköp in that the former were 
intended only for the nobility, while the latter were open to all 
non-noble classes in Swedish society, including peasants, mer-
chants and industrialists. Another difference had to do with fiscal 
revenues. When a noble officer bought a crown farm, the peasant 
living on that farm began to pay most of his obligations to him. 
The state only received the sale price. In contrast, after skatteköp 
the fiscal revenues continued to flow to the treasury as before.12
The frälseköp purchases were quite important during the Swedish 
offensive in Poland. In the 1620s, the state derived half of its cash 
income from these sales. In 1624, the share of frälseköp accounted 
for as much as 60% of all incomes. No scholars have studied the 
 11 Loit 1979.
 12 Brännman 1950; Rydeberg 1985, pp. 39–41.
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importance of skatteköp, though revenues were probably much 
smaller considering that the sales were relatively infrequent in 
most provinces of the realm outside central Sweden. Little research 
has been done on the topic, but it seems as if most sales were con-
centrated in the provinces of Värmland, Närke, Östra Götaland 
and Västra Götaland. In Finland, in all probability not a single 
farm was sold.13
The Swedish Realm also continued its aggressive foreign pol-
icy after the 1630s. It participated in the Thirty Years War, and it 
fought against Poland, Denmark, Russia, Austria and Brandenburg 
between 1655 and 1661. The final military campaign of the 17th 
century took place Scania in 1675–1679. All these operations, 
however, were financed by resorting to means other than selling 
crown farms because the Royal Regency Council forbade the sales 
in May 1639. The motivations behind the decision are not known. 
Probably the regency wanted to stop the sales because the crown 
farms were needed for other purposes, namely for the noble 
officers who had distinguished themselves on the continental 
battlefields: A significant number of farms and fiscal revenues 
were donated to nobility by the regency and later on by Queen 
Christina (r. 1644–1654). The frälseköp purchases continued until 
the 1680s.14
The Sales During the Great Northern War
The third and the last phase in the history of skatteköp began in 
the spring of 1701, one year after the onset of the Great Northern 
War. This time the sales were also part of the Swedish war econ-
omy. In March 1701, King Charles XII (Sw. Karl XII), residing 
 13 Bergström 1920, pp. 45–47; Brännman 1950, pp. 245–260; Rydeberg 
1985, pp. 39–41.
 14 The sales of crown farms did not stop totally in May 1639. A few 
farms were sold to iron works during the 17th century. The extent of 
such sales is not known, however. Kuylenstierna 1916, pp. 104–106; 
Karlsson 1990, pp. 158–159. 
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in a winter camp in present-day Estonia, wrote to the Chamber 
College (Sw. Kammarkollegiet), the most important central agency 
in all issues related to taxation and crown properties, ordering the 
agency to initiate the sales once again because he needed more 
resources for his campaign in Livonia. He mentions in his letter 
that other former monarchs had also resorted to the same method 
in wartime situations.15
The king’s order was based on a memorandum composed at the 
Chamber College in the autumn of 1700. In this document, the sales 
were justified not just as a means to collect money for the ongoing 
war but also on the grounds that the state had nothing to lose in 
the trade. Every silver daler (hereinafter abbreviated sd.) that the 
state was able to obtain from the sales was pure profit because 
peasants continued to pay their rent as before. Thus, the logic was 
the same as with the bördsrätt sales. Furthermore, the members 
of the Chamber College estimated that peasant farmers would set-
tle their taxes more reliably after the skatteköp, because they did 
not want to forfeit the newly acquired property immediately to 
the crown. As mentioned above, the crown was entitled to confis-
cate a freeholding farm after three years of tax arrears. This legal 
norm was abandoned in 1789.
Both arguments reveal that state officials saw the crown lands 
as a source of fiscal revenues and not as capital having the poten-
tial to produce something more than just tax yields. Therefore, 
from the crown’s point of view, it did not matter who owned 
the farms in Sweden: the state or private persons. The Chamber 
College even considered that peasants would cultivate the farms 
better when they knew for sure that all their efforts to ameliorate 
the farm economy would also benefit their offspring.16
It was not a coincidence that the sales began in the spring of 
1701. The Privy Council (Sw. Riksrådet) was desperately looking 
for new sources of income at the beginning of the second year of 
war, because thus far expenditures had far outstripped available 
 15 Bergström 1919 vol. II, p. 79.
 16 Bergström 1919 vol. II, pp. 189–192.
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incomes. The Privy Council and the Chamber College wrote 
to the king in February 1701 that, according to their estimation, 
the budget deficit would be eight million sd. in 1701. There were 
several reasons behind the deficit. Severe crop failures and out-
right famine in the 1690s continued to negatively impact public 
finances in 1701 because many peasants had difficulties in pay-
ing their annual taxes. Also, the siege of Riga by Saxon troops 
and the associated loss of custom duties in 1700 affected the 
war economy.17
The central government in Stockholm made several proposals to 
the king to fix the deficit. They included the collecting of a war tax 
in Sweden and Finland, the launching of new loan negotiations 
with foreign and domestic lenders, the cutting of public spending, 
and the selling of crown farms. The Privy Council also expressed 
the desire that ‘God will bless the king’s righteous army’, so that 
it would manage to extract resources from the occupied territo-
ries in Livonia and elsewhere. What was common to all these sug-
gestions was that they had been made several times before. The 
collecting of war taxes was essential to the Swedish war economy 
throughout the 17th century, and King Charles XII had no inten-
tion of abandoning the method when he came to power in 1697. 
War taxes were collected almost every year from the year 1699 
onwards, except for the years 1713, 1715 and 1716, when the 
war tax was replaced by a wealth tax based on immovable and 
movable property.18
Likewise, the government had begun borrowing money before 
the spring of 1701. The crown began to pledge all kinds of crown 
properties, such as estates, mills, fisheries and customs duties, as 
collateral for cash or grain and other victuals in the winter of 1700. 
The operation produced over two million sd. between 1700 and 
1711. The selling of crown farms yielded nearly half a million sd. 
 17 Historiska handlingar 1861 vol. I, pp. 114–117; Cavallie 1975, 
pp. 48–50.
 18 Historiska handlingar 1861 vol. 1, p. 130; Åmark 1961, p. 530; 
Cavallie 1975, pp. 53–64.
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by the year 1719, meaning a profit of 27,000 sd. annually, which 
can be considered a relatively low figure compared to other sources 
of income. The contributions brought in 8.7 million sd. between 
1700 and 1709, and the loans from the Bank of the Estates of the 
Realm (Sw. Riksens ständers bank), the national central bank, rose 
to 5.7 million sd. during the same time period. On the other hand, 
most of the crown farms were sold at the beginning of the cam-
paign. In 1704, for instance, the crown managed to sell its farms 
for 300,000 sd., which was not an insignificant figure.19
There is also some evidence that the crown actively tried to pro-
mote the sales during the first few years of war. For instance, in 
the province of Göteborg and Bohus in western Sweden, the local 
county governor sent his representatives to the countryside to ask 
the farmers who actually tilled the crown farms (Sw. kronobönder) 
whether or not they were interested in buying the farms from the 
crown. When the peasants reported that they were too poor to 
redeem the farms, the representatives responded that the crown 
was also entitled to sell the farms to outsiders. The threat was 
based on law. According to the regulations, enacted in the spring 
of 1701, all the crown farms were to be sold in public auctions, 
and everybody had the right to participate in these sales, inde-
pendent of his social position.
There was one exception. A farmer who lived on a crown farm 
being put up for sale was entitled to buy the farm if he managed 
to pay the same sum as the highest bidder. In practice, the sale 
prices were often so high that peasants were unable to participate 
in the auctions. One-third of all the crown farms sold were bought 
by officers, priests and other persons of high social standing in 
Sweden between 1700 and 1723. As regards Finland, only 19 crown 
farms were sold between 1700 and 1719. Thus, practically all the 
profits mentioned above came from Sweden.20
 19 Brandell 1941, p. 82; Ahlström 1959, pp. 79–82; Åmark 1961, 
pp. 603–604; Cavallie 1975, p. 197.
 20 RA, Kammarkollegiets kansliarkiv, register över skattebrev 1701–1730 
(B VI b 1, vol. 1); Kyle 1987, pp. 80–81.
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The Sales of Crown Farms and Public Debt
The Great Northern War ended in August 1721. The crown con-
tinued to sell its farms, however, without interruption. This was 
an unusual situation, because previously the skatteköp sales had 
typically been a wartime phenomenon. Why did the central gov-
ernment also want to continue with the sales in peacetime? To 
understand the reasons, it is necessary to take a closer look at a 
decision made in the Diet in the spring of 1719, when hostilities 
were still ongoing.
One of the most important questions the Diet had to address 
in 1719 was the heavy war debt, which is estimated to have been 
approximately 63 to 64 million sd. The sum was equal to all pri-
vate wealth in Sweden and Finland at that time, according to the 
wealth tax of 1713. It is possible to clarify the magnitude of the debt 
by comparing the sum to the state budget. According to estimates 
made during the spring of 1719, the fiscal incomes for the ongoing 
year were to be 3.5 million sd., that is to say, just over a twentieth 
the size of the debt. In reality, incomes increased to eight million sd. 
in 1719. The prospects, however, were much worse in April 1719, 
when members of the Diet discussed settling the national debt.21
The debt consisted of several elements, and the structure of 
liabilities is highly telling in terms of the Swedish war economy 
during the Great Northern War. Several public institutions, such 
as the churches, schools and poorhouses, had been obliged to 
loan cash and valuables to the crown. For instance, churches had 
been ordered to give to the state all the silver objects that were 
not needed for services. Officers and civil servants had been given 
promissory notes as compensation for unpaid salaries, and several 
wealthy families as well as foreign bankers and merchants from 
the Netherlands, France, England and Austria had lent money 
to the king. The sultan of the Ottoman Empire was also among 
the creditors, because King Charles XII had spent several years in 
exile in the Ottoman Empire after the defeat in Poltava.22
 21 Axelson 1888, p. 132; Malmström 1893, p. 120; Åmark 1961, 
pp. 598–599; Fregert & Gustafsson 2008, p. 4.
 22 Julén 1916, pp. 9–23.
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The single most significant element consisted of coin tokens 
(Sw. nödmynt, literally meaning emergency coins) and coin notes 
(Sw. myntsedlar) issued in 1715–1719. As regards the coins, the 
value of the copper metal from which they were minted was only 
0.5–1% of their face value. This was not the first time token coins 
had been used to finance military campaigns in the Swedish Realm. 
King John III had also issued debased coins in the early 1590s. The 
idea behind such emergency coins was that the state would redeem 
the coins at their full value after the war had ended. That was not the 
case, however. The Diet decided in April 1719 that all the coin 
tokens valued at one sd. would be redeemed for another token 
coin valued at two öre silvermynt (1 sd. = 32 öre silvermynt) and 
a note valued at 14 öre silvermynt. The decision meant that the 
token coins were devalued by 50%. The same principles were fol-
lowed for coin notes. As a whole, the redemption of coin tokens 
and coin notes cost the government nearly 27 million sd.23
The Diet made another important decision in April 1719 con-
cerning public debt. It decided to establish a special department 
for the purpose of redeeming the coins and notes and ultimately 
paying the liabilities to all the creditors in a special order speci-
fied in the statutes. The department was first called the Office 
of the Estates (Sw. Riksens ständers kontor) and later renamed 
the National Debt Office (Sw. Riksgäldskontoret). The Diet also 
decided to channel several flows of revenues to the office. The most 
important source of income was a new tax called lön­ och betal­
ningsavgift, which was a personal auxiliary tax somewhat similar to a 
contribution. The level of taxation was determined according to 
one’s social position. High-ranking officers and bishops had to pay 
more than ordinary peasant farmers. The second most important 
source of revenue was an extra customs duty (Sw. licenten), which 
was collected upon all imported goods. This new tax was also col-
lected for such exports as copper, iron, timber, tar and grain.24
The sales of crown farms constituted the third most important 
source of revenue for the office. The idea to use skatteköp profits to 
 23 Åmark 1961, pp. 4–5, 683.
 24 Julén 1916, pp. 35–41; Åmark 1961, pp. 676–682.
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amortise public debt was probably first proposed by senior judge 
(Sw. lagman) Bernhard Cederholm in a meeting of the Secret 
Council on 8 April. The secret council was the most powerful 
committee of the Diet, and most of the bills were first discussed 
there before the Estates took a stand on the issue. Other mem-
bers of the committee supported the proposition, and later, in 
May 1719, the Estates confirmed the new application of the 
skatteköp payments.25
The decision had far-reaching effects. All the skatteköp payments 
were used to repay government debt throughout the 18th century, 
except for the year 1764 and the years 1773–1789, when the sales 
were forbidden. After that, the sales continued in Sweden with-
out interruption until the 20th century. In Finland, the situation 
changed in 1809 when the country became part of the Russian 
Empire. Henceforth, the payments were used as any other public 
incomes, because the newly born Grand Duchy of Finland refused 
to take any responsibility for public debt originating before 1809.
The fact that the sale of crown farms was linked to the amortisa-
tion of public debt did not mean that all members of the political 
elite supported the sales after 1719. Members of the noble estate in 
particular criticised the continuation of the operation on several 
occasions during the 18th century. The aristocracy thought that it 
would be better to use the crown farms to support the manufactur-
ing industry and manorial economy than to sell the farms cheaply 
to the peasantry. Critics often had a personal stake in the debate.
Johan Ehrenpreus, an arms factory owner and a leader of the 
maritime customs house (Sw. Stora sjötullen) in Stockholm, 
wrote a long memorandum to the Diet in 1723, in which he asked 
the Estates to stop the sales once and for all because, in his 
opinion, it would become more difficult to manage iron works 
if all the farms around industrial plants were freeholding farms. 
Ehrenpreus wanted to remind the Estates that iron works needed 
two things above all: raw materials and cheap labour. He argued 
 25 RA, Frihetstidens utskottshandlingar, Sekreta utskottets protokoll 
8.4.1719, fol. 119–137 (mf. KA); Staf 1945 vol. I, p. 116; Thanner 
1980 vol. V, p. 62.
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that the sale of crown farms made it difficult to fulfil both these 
needs because freeholding farmers asked higher prices than the 
farmers of crown estates. He also wrote that the sales violated 
the privileges guaranteed to the manufacturing industry in 1668. 
According the statute, the founders of textile factories, glassworks 
and other manufactures were allowed to ask the crown to donate 
land to them to facilitate raw material acquisitions. In Ehrenpreus’s 
opinion, such privileges would be of no use if all the farms were 
freeholding farms.26
As regards the manorial economy, Ehrenpreus referred to 
the privileges of the nobility. This law-like prerogative enabled the 
aristocracy to change their tax-exempt farms (Sw. frälsehemman) 
into crown farms when located near manors to facilitate the emer-
gence of large and integrated stretches of cultivation. According 
to Ehrenpreus, the skatteköp legislation was inconsistent with the 
prerogative because such changes were only possible so long as 
crown farms were available in the vicinity of manors.27
Ehrenpreus’s objective did not win support from his fellow mem-
bers of the nobility. All the estates endorsed continuing the sales 
of crown farms in the Diet of 1723. However, a new law enacted 
during the same year did satisfy several of his goals. According 
to the statute, the owners of metal works and manufacturers had 
a pre-emptive right to the crown farms of surrounding area, and 
owners of cavalry farms (Sw. rusthåll), i.e. farms that provided a 
cavalryman, horses and equipment for the crown in exchange for 
a partial tax exemption, had a similar pre-emptive right to their 
auxiliary farms (Sw. augmentshemman). Both these preroga-
tives advanced the development of large domains in Sweden and 
Finland. The owners of iron works in particular managed to 
enlarge their landholdings by purchasing large numbers of crown 
farms during the 18th century.28
Twice, critics managed to prevent the sales altogether. The first 
time the sales were abolished in December 1763. The principal 
 26 Bergström 1919 vol. II, pp. 216–218.
 27 Ibid.
 28 Laine 1950; Karlsson 1990.
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reason was a heavy rate of inflation caused by the Swedish Realm’s 
involvement in the anti-Prussian alliance during the Seven Years 
War (1756–1763). The war effort was mainly financed by borrow-
ing money from the central bank. According to Patrick Winton, the 
loans from the central bank covered 44% of military expenditures 
in 1757–1764, while the share of French subsidies, the second 
most important resource base, was 20%. The central bank paid 
for the loan by issuing new bank notes. The number of notes in 
circulation increased from 13.8 million sd. in 1755 to 44 mil-
lion sd. in 1763, causing a rapid depreciation of the Swedish cur-
rency in relation to the most important foreign currencies, such 
as the Hamburger reichstaler, and consequently the cost of living 
increased throughout the Swedish Realm especially after 1759.29
The Privy Council reacted to the situation by abolishing the 
sales of crown farms for the time being, because the sale prices 
did not follow the overall rate of inflation, and consequently the 
crown lost money in every transaction. The argumentation was 
based on the fact that the level of skatteköp payments was tied to 
the annual rent paid by crown farmers. In Sweden, the minimum 
price was equal to six years of annual rent payments from 1723 
onwards; in Finland, the minimum price was equivalent to three 
years’ rent beginning after the year 1741. The prices of freeholding 
farms, however, were set by the markets, which meant that buyers 
were able to use the system to their benefit.
The council was under the impression that people were buy-
ing crown farms at low prices just to resell them at profit soon 
thereafter. As a solution, the Privy Council suggested that, in the 
future, all crown farms should be sold at auctions, as had hap-
pened during the Great Northern War. The government reminded 
the Estates that the purpose of the sales was to collect funding for 
repayment of the public debt and not to take care of the security of 
the peasant farmers, ‘since the farmers were secure enough as long 
as they cultivated the crown farms according to the law’.30
 29 Jörberg 1972, pp. 75–90; Winton 2012.
 30 Paloposki 1976, pp. 216–217.
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The abolishing of the sale of crown farms was short-lived at 
the end. The Diet decided to rescind the decision in 1765 with the 
support of all the non-noble estates (peasants, clergy and burgh-
ers), and no alterations were made to the pricing policy. The peas-
ant estate participated most actively in the process. Members of 
the clergy and burgher estates decided to support the peasants 
mainly for tactical purposes, as they wanted to count on peas-
ants’ support on issues important for them. Several members of 
the nobility would have liked to continue the decision to abolish 
sales made by the Privy Council, but they did not manage to find 
enough support for their views from the other estates.31
The sale of crown farms was abolished for a second time in 
October 1773, one year after the coup d’état of King Gustav III. 
This time, too, the ban was justified by referring to low sales prices. 
The Chamber College complained in 1779 that the skatteköp pro-
cess had enabled private persons to become rich at the expense 
of the crown, because the sales prices had constantly been far 
below the market prices. The college also argued that the sales 
were inconsistent with the privileges of nobility and the manufac-
turing industry, just like Johan Ehrenpreus had argued 50 years 
earlier.32 The new political situation affected the outcome, too. The 
coup put an end to the Age of Liberty (1719–1772), the period of 
early parliamentarism in Swedish history, meaning that the peas-
ants were less capable of having an impact on domestic policies. 
The Diet convened rarely, and it was the king, not the parliament, 
who was the supreme exerciser of power in the realm.
The ban was in force until the winter of 1789. During that time, 
King Gustav III was at war against Russia, and he had to summon 
the Diet in order to obtain more resources for his war efforts.
The central bank was unable to lend enough money to the king, 
and foreign investors in the Dutch Republic and Genoa were not 
as eager to give credit as they had been in the 1770s and early 
1780s. The king did not see any other alternative but to ask the 
Diet to accept a new financial programme consisting of a new war 
 31 Kyle 1987, pp. 184–185.
 32 Bergström 1919 vol. II, pp. 427, 436–437, 456.
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tax and new government debt of twenty million riksdalers, which 
the Estates promised to take over the administration of. To win 
over the peasants, the king promised to support several of their 
demands, including the withdrawal of the sales ban on crown 
farms. The withdrawal was put into force in February 1789.33
Sale Revenues in 1701–1808
Since the raison d’être of the sales of crown farms was fiscal at base, 
at least at the beginning of the operation, it is of interest to investi-
gate how much the sales produced for the treasury. The results are 
summarised in Table 4.1.
A couple of remarks are in order before analysing the results 
any further. First, the figures are chiefly derived from the nomi-
nal ledgers of the National Debt Office, founded in May 1719 by 
the Diet.34 Until 1777, the official accounting unit was silver daler; 
after the monetary reform of 1777, the principal unit was silver 
riksdaler (Sw. riksdaler specie). The official conversion rate 
was six to one (6 sd. = 1 riksdaler specie). However, after 1789 
the National Debt Office began to issue riksdaler paper notes 
(Sw. riksdaler riksgälds) to finance the ongoing warfare with Russia. 
These notes could be converted into silver riksdalers, but their 
value began to fall during the late 1790s, and until 1803 the silver 
standard was de facto replaced by a multi-currency with varying 
exchange rates. In 1789, for instance, the premium was 1–7%, and 
in 1798 approximately 50%. The National Debt Office used both 
currencies in its bookkeeping, and as a consequence it has been 
necessary to convert all the figures expressed in riksdaler riksgälds 
into riksdaler specie.35
Secondly, the column ‘returns’ in the table refers to the fact that 
the National Debt Office was obliged to return a varying sum 
of skatteköp payments to the countryside each year. Most of the 
 33 Åmark 1961, p. 633; Winberg 1985, pp. 187–189; Gärdebo 2009. 
 34 About the organisational changes see Åmark 1961.
 35 The conversion is done using the exchange rates calculated by 
Rodney Edvinsson. See Edvinsson 2010, p. 209.
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returns probably resulted from conflictual transactions. It was 
relatively common that two parties competed for the same crown 
farm. Sometimes it happened that both the competing parties paid 
the sale price to the treasury to further their chances. After the 
dispute was over, the Office sent the losing party’s payment back.
When the returns are also taken into account, the sales of crown 
farms yielded altogether approximately 5.7 million sd. between 
1701 and 1808. The impact of inflation is ignored here. On a yearly 
basis, the profits were approximately 60,900 sd., while allowing for 
the fact that the sales were banned between 28 October 1773 and 
21 February 1789. The crown received annual incomes of the same 
size from the renting of the crown demesnes and other crown prop-
erties (43,000 sd.), from lighthouse and pilot taxes (43,800 sd.), 
Table 4.1: Sales revenues in Sweden and Finland, 1701–1808 (nominal 
values).
Revenues Returns Total revenues
1701–1718 481,276 sd. no information 481,276 sd.
1719–1765 2,493,874 sd. 148,019 sd. 2,345,855 sd.
1766–1776a 281,273 sd. 52,839 sd. 228,434 sd.






Total 5,906,737 sd. 244,940 sd. 5,661,797 sd.
sd. = daler silvermynt; rdr sp = riksdaler specie (Exchange rate: 1 rdr 
sp = 6 sd.)
a Although the sales were banned in 1773–1789, the skatteköp payments 
continued to flow to the National Debt Office (Sw. Riksgäldskontoret) 
until 1776.
Sources: Ahlström 1959, p. 82 (1701–1718); RA, riksens ständers 
kontor, kammarkontoret, renskrivna huvudböcker (1719–1762); RA, 
riksens ständers kontor, kammarkontoret, koncepthuvudböcker (1764– 
1765); RA, Riksdagen 1765–1766, kontorsdeputationen (R3381); RA, 
statskontoret, kammarkontoret, memorialböcker över riksgälds- och 
manufakturfonderna (1766–1776); RA, riksgäldsarkiven, riksgälds-
kontoret, bokslutskontoret, renskrivna huvudböcker (1789–1808). 
Table by the author.
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and from fines (39,200 sd.). The annual rent levied on the crown 
farms and freeholding farms, the most important source of fiscal 
income during the 18th century, yielded approximately two 
million sd. annually between 1722 and 1776. In that respect, 
the profits were relatively small.36
The best way to place the profits in perspective is to compare the 
skatteköp payments to other revenues obtained by the National 
Debt Office. As mentioned before, the Diet assigned the Office the 
task of collecting several sources of income in 1719, including a 
new personal tax called the lön­ och betalningsavgift, an extra cus-
tom duty (Sw. licenten) and the skatteköp payments. Other smaller 
resources were allocated to the Office as well, such as the incomes 
generated by the auctions of booties and by the sales of captured 
merchant vessels. Most of the proceeds came from the lön­ och 
betalningsavgift tax and the custom duty between 1719 and 1765. 
They accounted for nearly 90% of all incomes. The share of the 
skatteköp payments was 6%.37
The proportions were approximately the same between 1766 
and 1776, although the data is more fragmentary. No nominal 
ledgers have been preserved; only two memorial books are availa-
ble that contain information on the three most important sources 
of income. According to these books, the share of the skatteköp 
payments was only 3%. Most of the incomes originated from the 
lön­ och betalningsavgift tax.38
After 1789, the income structure of the National Debt Office 
changed significantly, as the crown began to collect a new extraor-
dinary tax (Sw. bevillning) in the middle of the Russo-Swedish 
War of 1788–1790. This new tax, the collection of which also 
continued after the war, was by far the most important source of 
income for the Office, yielding nearly 30 million silver riksdalers 
between 1789 and 1808. Its share was nearly 70% of all revenues. 
 36 Åmark 1961, pp. 417–418, 433.
 37 Åmark 1961, pp. 689–701.
 38 RA, Statskontoret, Kammarkontoret, Memorialböcker över riksgälds- 
 och manufakturfonderna (1766–1776).
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The lön­ och betalningsavgift tax brought in 2.6 million riksdalers 
during the same period, forming the second most important 
income group. The share of the skatteköp payments in contrast 
was only 1% in 1789–1808.39 From a fiscal standpoint, their role was 
relatively insignificant. The National Debt Office would also have 
managed perfectly well without selling a single crown farm.
The Progress of the Sales of Crown Farms
The profits of skatteköp were distributed quite unevenly both in 
terms of time and space. Most of the yields came from Sweden. 
This can clearly be seen in the two diagrams (Figures 4.1 and 4.2), 
which describe the distribution of sales revenues in the Swedish 
Realm between 1719 and 1808. Approximately 80% of all the pro-
ceeds originated from the Swedish provinces during that period. 
The geographical difference was even greater before 1719, because 
only a handful of crown farms were sold in Finland during the 
Great Northern War, as mentioned before.
The lack of interest was quite probably related to the pre-famine 
situation in Finland. Hundreds of freeholding farms became 
crown farms during the late 17th century because of the large-
scale fiscal desertion rates. It would have been surprising if the 
crown peasants had been able to redeem the farms just a couple 
of years after the catastrophic famine. The Russian invasion of 
Finland and the subsequent military occupation put an end to the 
already faint interest after 1713.
As regards the post-1719 situation, the difference between Sweden 
and Finland partly resulted from the fact that, in Sweden, the mini-
mum price was two times higher than in Finland after 1741. In that 
sense, the diagrams do not convey a totally reliable picture of the 
geographical differences. The skatteköp sales were to some extent 
more popular in Finland than the spread of the revenues suggests.
The geographical differences become even more obvious when 
looking at individual provinces. The sales of crown farms yielded the 
most in central and southern Sweden as well as in south-western 
 39 Åmark 1961, pp. 637–639.
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Finland. In the province of Östergötland, the revenues increased to 
324,019 sd., while in the province of Turku and Pori they increased 
to 206,190 sd. and in the province of Skaraborg to 147,461 sd. in 
1719–1765. The sales revenues also exceeded one hundred thou-
sand sd. in the provinces of Södermanland, Jönköping, Älvsborg, 
Malmöhus, Göteborg, Uppsala and Kristanstad. In the province 
of Dalarna, in contrast, the sales yielded less than six thousand 
sd. during the same period. The profits were relatively low also in 
northern Sweden and eastern Finland.40
The distribution was approximately the same after 1789. The 
National Debt Office received the greatest profits from the prov-
inces of Östergötland (65,121 rdr sp), Kristianstad (59,095 rdr sp), 
 40 See Table 4.1 for sources. 
Figure 4.1: The total revenues from skatteköp sales in the Swedish realm 
as well as in Finland between 1719 and 1776 (sd.) 
Sources: RA, Riksens Ständers kontor, Kammarkontoret, renskrivna 
huvudböcker (1719–1762); RA, Riksens Ständers kontor, Kammark-
ontoret, koncepthuvudböcker (1764–1765); RA, Riksdagen 1765–
1766, kontorsdeputationen (R3381); Edvinsson & Söderberg 2010, 
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Malmöhus (52,046 rdr sp), and Turku and Pori (46,711 rdr sp). In 
most of the other provinces in Sweden and Finland, the revenues 
remained under 10,000 rdr sp. In Värmland, the proceeds were as 
low as 151 rdr sp between 1789 and 1808. That was by far the lowest 
figure in the Swedish Realm. The geographical differences reflect the 
prevalence of crown land in separate parts of the realm. In Dalarna, 
for instance, most of the farms were freeholding farms already in 
1700, whereas in southern Sweden (Götaland) the share of crown 
land was over 40%, on average, at the beginning of the Great North-
ern War. In Turku and Pori, the share of crown land was over 80% in 
the 1720s, when the sales began to increase in Finland.41
When it comes to the chronology of the sales, the most strik-
ing feature is the close temporal connection between the skatteköp 
sales and military campaigns, not just during the Great Northern 
War but also after the year of 1721, when the sales officially had 
nothing to do with the Swedish war economy. Most of the sales 
took place during the Seven Years War (1756–1763) and during 
the Russo-Swedish War of 1788–1790. The connection is not a 
coincidence. The rapid increase in sales after the outbreak of the 
Seven Years War was probably a reaction to the extensive issuing 
of paper notes mentioned before.
The notes began to fall in value rapidly after 1755, and people 
tried to exchange them as quickly as possible for specie coins, 
making the coins very difficult to come by.42 It is quite likely that, 
under these circumstances, the buying of real estate became an 
attractive option both in rural and urban areas. The forceful 
increase of skatteköp revenues after 1755 seems to point towards 
that kind of reaction. It should be noted in this connection that 
the increase was not caused by inflation but by real growth in 
sales activity, because sales prices were connected to annual 
taxes, which were not affected by governmental monetary policy.
Additionally, new statutes and sales bans affected the course of 
events. Probably the most important single new regulation was 
 41 Gadd 2000, pp. 43–44.
 42 Winton 2012, p. 23.
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one that broadened the pre-emptive rights of the owners of cav-
alry farms. The statute was enacted in 1756, and it had immedi-
ate consequences for the sales process. In Sweden, every second 
crown farm was sold to an owner of a cavalry farm in 1761–1765.43 
It is impossible to give corresponding figures for Finland owing 
to gaps in the source material. Deducing from the discussions at 
the Diet, however, it is possible to conclude that the cavalry farm 
owners were active also in Finland, and that the owners were often 
noble officers or other persons of standing.
The rapid decrease in sales revenues afterwards was caused by 
a ban on sales in 1764. This is clearly seen when comparing the 
level of inflation to the changes in skatteköp revenues during 
the mid-18th century (see Figure 4.1). The revenues peaked four 
years before the inflation, and sales began to decrease after 1763 
 43 Heckscher 1944, p. 116; Rydeberg 1985, pp. 99–103.
Figure 4.2: The revenues from skatteköp sales in the Swedish realm in 
1789–1808 (rdr sp). 
Source: RA, Riksgäldsarkiven, Riksgäldskontoret, Bokslutskontoret, 
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when the overall price level was still rising. As for the peak in 
1790, it was evidently related to the repeal of the second sales ban. 
Peasants seemingly wanted to redeem the crown farms they were 
tilling as quickly as possible, scared that the sales window might 
not be open forever.
Conclusions
The large-scale selling of crown farms is often quite straightfor-
wardly linked to the improved social and economic position of 
peasants in pre-industrial Sweden and Finland. The conclusion 
is understandable when looking at the final outcome. Tens of 
thousands of crown farms were sold to private persons during the 
18th and 19th centuries, and most of the farms were bought by 
peasants actually living on these farms. In Finland, the number of 
farms sold was over 40,000; in Sweden, the figure must have been 
significantly higher.
However, the original purpose of the process was not to improve 
peasants’ living conditions but to gather funds for ongoing mili-
tary expenditures during the Great Northern War. The Swedish 
crown had resorted to the same means earlier, first in the 1580s 
and later in the 1620s. What was different during the 18th cen-
tury was that the sales also continued after the war. The principal 
motivation was the heavy national debt caused by the war efforts 
between 1700 and 1718. The crown needed all available cash flows 
for a situation in which the national economy was in ruins.44
On a general level, the skatteköp sales were a method to mobi-
lise private resources for warfare. From the state’s point of view, 
the method was comparable to war taxes, debasement of coins, 
pledging of state property, short-term credits, or other ad hoc 
means to raise funding in a situation when military expendi-
ture rose exponentially. When it comes to the actual profits, they 
were relatively low throughout the 18th century. Sales proceeds 
were probably quite essential at the very beginning of the Great 
Northern War, and again in 1719, when the revenues were 
 44 Karonen 2008.
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redirected to the National Debt Office. In general, however, the 
incomes were quite insignificant compared to other fiscal incomes 
used to finance warfare or to amortise national debt. Some mem-
bers of the nobility considered that a problem during the Age 
of Liberty. They wanted to obtain better profits or put a stop 
to the sales once and for all, and twice they succeeded in halting the 
sales temporarily.
The principal reason why the Diet decided to continue with 
the sales time and again was that the continuation of the sales 
was extremely important for the peasant estate throughout the 
18th century. So long as the other estates wanted to cooperate 
with peasants, it was unwise to support the sales bans.
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